General Sir Horace Lockwood Smith-Dorrien  


THE TIMES
Wednesday, 13 August 1930

Obituary
General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien
A GREAT SOLDIER  
 
  General Sir Horace Lockwood Smith-Dorrien, whose death is announced on another page, was a soldier whose true greatness was only revealed as the documentary evidence of the Great War gradually became available.   He was called upon to take crucial decisions, and he had the courage to take them.
  His name will always be associated with the Battle of Le Cateau on August 26, 1914, which he fought with the express though reluctant consent of Sir John French.   The II Army Corps, which Sir Horace commanded, administered such a check to the oncoming Germans that it was enabled to withdraw from the field unpursued and to continue it's retreat for ten days without serious molestation.   It suffered heavy casualties but far less than it inflicted, and it earned this tribute from Von Kluck: -
  The way the retreat was carried out was remarkable.   I tried very hard to outflank them, but I could not do so.   If I had succeeded, the war would have been won.
  It is probably not too much to say that Smith-Dorrien's decision to stand and fight at Le Cateau saved the British Expeditionary Forces from annihilation.
  The son of R. A. Smith-Dorrien, of Haresfoot, Herts, and brother to the late Mr. Smith-Dorrien-Smith, of Tresco Abbey, Scilly Isles, he was born on May 26, 1858.   From Harrow, he joined the 95th Foot, The Sherwood Foresters, in February, 1876.   In 1878 he went out to Zululand on special services with the new creation of the day, mounted infantry.   At Isandhlwana in January, 1879, a small column consisting chiefly of the 24th Foot was surprised in camp by a Zulu impi, and only three or four of the British troops escaped the ensuing massacre, Smith-Dorrien, who had been a fine long-distance runner at school, succeeded in evading on foot the savages in pursuit of him.   On the evidence of witnesses he was recommended for the V.C. for two separate acts on that day.   These recommendations drew laudatory letters from the War Office, with a regret that, as the proper channels for correspondence had not been observed, the statutes did not admit of his receiving the distinction.   Next July he saw his comrades avenged at Uhundi; he himself charged the fleeing Zulus with his mounted men.
Egypt and South Africa
  Then came the Egyptian campaign of 1882.   Once more employed with mounted infantry, Smith-Dorrien was at Tel-el-Kebir, and in the following year he took service with the Egyptian Army, being then just promoted captain.   For the next five years he served in that country.   First engaged in 1864 with the Egyptian troops in the Valley of the Nile, he went through the continuous fighting of that season.   Then in the next year he was at Suakin, once more in command of mounted infantry.   Later in the season, after joining the Sudan Frontier Force, he took part in Sir F. Stephenson's defeat of the Dervishes at Giniss, where he led the pursuit of the Dervishes with Egyptian mounted troops.   He left Egypt in January, 1887, with a D.S.O. and the Orders of the Osmanieh and Medjidieh.
  Returning to England he spent 1889 and 1890 at the Staff College, and less than 18 months elapsed before he was promoted major and embarked to join his regiment in India.   First he was a station staff officer, but was soon appointed D.A.A.G. in Bengal, and later A.A.G. in the Punjab.   This move resulted in his accompanying the Chitral Relief Force of 1893.
  He then reverted to his regiment, and went through the frontier campaign of 1897-8 in Tirah.   After that he was called to the Sudan, where he had left many friends.   He arrived in the summer of 1898, just in time to take part in the battle of Omdurman and in the subsequent operations in the Nile Valley.   A brevet-colonelcy was his reward, and in January, 1899, he was promoted regimentally to the command of his battalion.   With 23 years service he had now amassed a remarkable experience of "small" warfare; he had passed through the Staff College and was a brevet-colonel.   Nor was the record lightly won, for Smith-Dorrien from the day of Isandhlwana onwards had served mainly with troops; he had led them in every rank through which he passed; his success was the result of honest service and an unquestioned gift of leadership of men.
  On the outbreak of the South African War, in 1899, the Sherwood Foresters went to the Cape and, on Lord Robert's reorganization of his forces, Smith-Dorrien received the command of the 19th Brigade, 9th Division, being promoted major-general.   He contributed much to the success of Paardeberg; he distinguished himself at Popular Grove.
  The capture of Thaba Nehu was largely his, while it is believed that the adoption of his plan would have




averted the failure at Sannah's Post, in the Eastern Transvaal.   Later on in the year the success of the operations round Belfast was the outcome of his handiwork.   It is true that he was near disaster during a night attack made upon his column by the enemy at Bothwell, but the steadiness of his troops and his own example saved them from destruction and himself from capture.   If Smith-Dorrien's whole activities in this war were noteworthy, equally so was the fighting spirit he infused into his troops.   His reputation for tenacity, combined with the intelligent handling of men, led the official historian to compare him to that great figure in war, Ulysses Grant.
  Returning home in the summer of 1901, he soon went out again to India, this time as Adjutant-General.   In July, 1903, he was transferred to the command of a 1st Class District, and shortly afterwards to that of the 4th (Quetta) Division of the Western Army Corps.   He was created a K.C.B. for his services in 1904, and was promoted lieutenant-general in 1906.
  After an absence of six years he returned to England to assume the chief command at Aldershot in December 1907.   In this important post, which he held for just over four years, he initiated a reform of much significance.   Hence forth the soldier was to be regarded as an individual capable of being treated in a liberal way; he was to be placed upon his honour with regard to the observance of military discipline; older methods of restrictions and of punishment were largely relaxed or abolished..   Unqualified success followed the innovation, and Smith-Dorrien's reputation as a sympathetic leader of men was assured.
  In February 1912, he handed over the Aldershot Command to Sir Douglas Haig, who had just returned from India, and took up the Southern Command at Salisbury.   His work continued on the same lines as at Aldershot, and with equally happy results.   He was promoted to General in 1912, and to G.C.B. in 1913.
Le Cateau
  The outbreak of the Great War found Sir Horace outside the pale of the Expeditionary Force.   But the sudden death of Sir James Grierson, who had been appointed to command the II Corps on Mobilization, left a vacancy which he alone could be called upon to fill.   So he took the field and commanded that Corps at Mons in August, 1914.   On this occasion, the second position prepared at his instance behind the canal was to be the main line of resistance, but owing to the stubborn fighting of the 3rd and 5th Divisions against six German divisions, it was not until evening that a retirement was ordered.   Then began the retreat.
  Two days later came the battle on which mainly hangs Smith-Dorrien's reputation as a soldier.   In the early morning of August 26 - the anniversary of the battle of Crecy - Smith-Dorrien, after conferring with General Allenby, commanding the Cavalry Division, and the late Sir Hubert Hamilton, commanding the 3rd Division, decided that he could not carry out the retreat
which Sir John French had ordered without fighting first.   It was a choice between standing to fight and being attacked on the move in broad daylight.   He therefore reported fully to the Commander-in-Chief the reasons for his decision, and he received a written reply the substance of which was: You are the man on the spot; if you really consider it necessary to fight you must do so; but break off the engagement as soon as you can and continue the retreat.   This document is quoted in General Edmonds's "Official History."   It is difficult to understand, therefore, why the Field-Marshal should have written in his book "1914" that there was "not a semblance of truth" in the statement that "some tacit consent" was given by him to Smith-Dorrien's decision.   Smith-Dorrien himself remained silent till 1925, when in his " Memoirs of 48 Years" Service he gave a dispassionate account of the reasons for his decision.
  The correctness of that decision is now acknowledged, and is confirmed from German sources.   On the eve of Le Cateau Von Kluck's army and Von Richthofen's cavalry corps were already in places in actual contact with the British troops.   Sir Douglas Haig's corps had the Sambre between it and the enemy, but the II Corps on the right had no such protection.   The position of its 3rd and 5th Divisions was perilous enough; that of the 4th Division, under General Snow, which though it did not form part of his corps, Smith-Dorrien could not leave in the lurch, was more perilous still.   It's units were still moving across the enemy's front in the early hours of August 26; they were not in line with the remainder of the II Corps. and could not possibly be ready to resume the retreat with them at the hour originally fixed.
  At 5 a.m. Von der Marwitz's three cavalry divisions opened fire on General Snow's men, and the artillery and infantry of Von Kluck's leading corps came into action soon afterwards.   Sordot's French cavalry on the west had by this time moved off, and had the British 3rd and 5th Divisions been caught streaming away in columns on the road, and been headed off by the German cavalry, with German infantry closing in on them there well have been another Sedan.
  As it was, Smith-Dorrien was able to withdraw his troops in the middle of the summer afternoon, and so effective had been their resistance that it was not till 6 a.m. on the following day that Von Kluck issued his order, "The in-retreat-supposed-enemy to be attacked wherever found."   Indeed, Von Kluck and his chief staff officer, Von Kuhl, were under the impression that at Le Cateau, they had fought the whole of the British Expeditionary Force, and when the later learned the truth, he wrote: - "One corps stands to fight, the other marches away.   Where was G.H.Q. that day ?"   The fog of war was certainly very dense in those critical days of August, 1914, but the summary of what was done at Le Cateau given in the Official History will surely be the final judgment of history: --




  Smith-Dorrien's troops had done what was thought to be impossible.   With both flanks more or less in the air they had turned on an enemy of at least twice their strength; had struck him hard and had withdrawn, except on the right flank of the 5th Division, practically without interference, with neither flank enveloped, having suffered losses certainly severe, but, considering the circumstances, by no means extravagant.   The men looked upon themselves as victors . . . . they had inflicted on the enemy casualties which are believed to have been out of all proportion to their own, and they had completely foiled the plan of the German commander.
THE MARNE AND AFTER
  The retreat came to an end.   Smith-Dorrien's Corps turned and fought on the Marne, and again at the Aisne, but his two Divisions, the 3rd and 5th, had incurred such heavy losses at Mons and Le Cateau that they could do little more than gain a bare footing on the northern bank.   There followed the early fighting in Flanders, where after a successful advance reaching nearly to La Bassée, heavy German reinforcements appeared, and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien wisely fell back a short distance to a line which he had selected from Givenchy past Neuve Chapelle and in front of Laventie.   This line, except that Neuve Chapelle changed hands twice, was maintained until 1918.   On December 26, on the re-formation of armies, Sir Horace was given command of the Second Army and of the left of the British line.
  During the second battle of Ypres Smith-Dorrien, seeing that the French north of him had retired and were obviously not going to counter-attack, expressed himself as being in favour of a retirement from the part of the salient still in British hands back to a line along the north-eastern ramparts of the town of Ypres.   Sir John French dissented; he urged the blow to prestige that such a move entailed.   On meeting with final refusal, and finding that he was slowly being deprived of control of the battle, Smith-Dorrien wrote to the Field-Marshall a letter in which he said that it had been obvious to him for a long time past that they could not see eye to eye, and that it was consequently, better for the cause that he (Smith-Dorrien) should retire.   As things turned out, this proved the end to a true soldier's career; a loss to the Army upon which it is now idle to speculate.
  On returning home, Sir Horace was created G.C.M.G., and was given command of the First Army of the Central Force maintained for Home Defence.   This was but a poor employment for a soldier of his calibre.   In November, 1915, he went out to East Africa to direct the conduct of the operations against the German forces surviving in that theatre of war.   But in the following February he fell seriously ill on the voyage out, so that he asked to be relieved of his command and returned home.   He was not again employed on active service, but bore the trial in dignified silence.   In January, 1917, he received the appointment of Lieutenant of the Tower of London, and held that sinecure until September, 1918, when he was nominated Governor of Gibraltar.   He filled that post with dignity and efficiency for five years.
  Among the many officers who established a great name in the period of small warfare before 1899, few had survived to participate in the Great War.   Some were well stricken in years; others had grown too senior in rank; several dropped out of the circle which was to staff the Army of 1914.   Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was an exception.   With his still youthful physique, his personal qualities, technical knowledge, and experience, all claimed recognition.   He was a man of the Army who had lived with it and for it; he always knew the temper of his men in a manner that was given to few.   Moreover, he was not of those who had sat in Whitehall; apart from the short time he spent in India as Adjutant-General he had never been an "office soldier."   It is true that he had his weaknesses; his direct manner may have lacked grace; he may have been hot tempered; he could think of nothing but his troops except perhaps, of his racing ponies; he was no courtier; he did not aspire to figure as a heaven-sent soldier or administrator.   But his soldierly merits were such that his name will surely live in the history of the British Army.
  Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was Colonel of the Sherwood Foresters from 1905, and was appointed A.D.C. General to the King in 1910.   He married, in 1902, Olive, daughter of Colonel Schneider, of Furness Abbey.   She was created D.B.E. in 1919.   He leaves three sons, of whom the eldest is a lieutenant in the King's Royal Rifle Corps.